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Can Americans Resist Surveillance? 
Ryan Calo† 
This Essay analyzes the ability of everyday Americans to resist and alter the 
conditions of government surveillance. Americans appear to have several avenues 
of resistance or reform. We can vote for privacy-friendly politicians, challenge sur-
veillance in court, adopt encryption or other technologies, and put market pressure 
on companies not to cooperate with law enforcement.  
In practice, however, many of these avenues are limited. Reform-minded officials 
lack the capacity for real oversight. Litigants lack standing to invoke the Constitution 
in court. Encryption is not usable and can turn citizens into targets. Citizens can 
extract promises from companies to push back against government surveillance on 
their behalf but have no recourse if these promises are not enforced. 
By way of method, this Essay adopts Professor James Gibson’s influential 
theory of affordances. Originating in psychology, and famous everywhere but in 
law, affordance theory has evolved into a general method of inquiry with its own 
useful vocabulary and commitments. This Essay leverages these concepts to lend 
structure to an otherwise-haphazard inquiry into the capabilities of citizens to per-
ceive and affect surveillance. This Essay contributes to affordance theory by insist-
ing that law itself represents an important affordance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The question in the title is far from straightforward. The 
majority of Americans who are concerned about government 
surveillance (52 percent)1 or who believe that there are inade-
quate limits on surveillance in place (65 percent)2 appear to have 
several avenues for resistance or reform.3 Americans could elect 
more representatives who care about privacy. They could chal-
lenge surveillance practices under the Constitution. They could 
 
 † Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law and (by 
courtesy) University of Washington Information School; Affiliate Scholar, Stanford Law 
School Center for Internet and Society and Yale Law School Information Society Project. 
Thank you to The University of Chicago Law Review and to participants in its Symposi-
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 1 Lee Rainie and Mary Madden, Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden (Pew 
Research Center, Mar 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SL3E-VSDC. 
 2 Mary Madden and Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes about Privacy, Security and 
Surveillance (Pew Research Center, May 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CT3X-6N8L. 
 3 See Rainie and Madden, Americans’ Privacy Strategies (cited in note 1). 
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take technological steps to protect their privacy or pressure the 
companies that hold their data to do so on their behalf. 
Yet the various capabilities of Americans to resist surveil-
lance—their antisurveillance “affordances”—turn out to be lim-
ited in complex and subtle ways. Elected officials lack the access 
and expertise that are necessary to conduct meaningful oversight 
of the intelligence community.4 Doctrines such as standing have 
limited the ability of litigants to seek redress for surveillance un-
der the First and Fourth Amendments.5 And while techniques 
like encryption and anonymization are capable of checking sur-
veillance in theory, in practice they are not very usable by the 
people who need them most.6 
This Essay assesses the capacity of Americans to resist and al-
ter the conditions of government surveillance through politics, law, 
technology, and markets. Despite some affinities, this analysis 
breaks from the New Chicago School that has so influenced 
cyberlaw by popularizing the idea that software itself can act 
with the force of law in a virtual environment like the Internet.7 
The New Chicago School expands the analytic framework by 
recognizing “code” and other modalities of regulation beyond 
law.8 But the approach is constraining as well: the New Chicago 
School is centrally concerned with the ability of governments or 
powerful firms to regulate human behavior rather than the ca-
pacity of individuals to negotiate such regulation.9 The picture is 
of law and technology as wrestling giants, threatening the citi-
zens underfoot. 
This Essay takes a markedly different approach, offering a 
structured means by which to explore the political, legal, techno-
logical, and market-based abilities of Americans on the ground to 
 
 4 See text accompanying notes 51–52. 
 5 See text accompanying notes 55–65. 
 6 See text accompanying notes 75–81. 
 7 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace 6 (Basic Books 1999) 
(“In cyberspace we must understand how code regulates. . . . Code is law.”). 
 8 See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J Legal Stud 661, 662–70 
(1998) (outlining the “four types of constraint[s]” that regulate behavior: law, social 
norms, markets, and architecture). 
 9 See Mark Tushnet, “Everything Old Is New Again”: Early Reflections on the “New 
Chicago School”, 1998 Wis L Rev 579, 586–90 (discussing the problems and oversights 
that result from the New Chicago School’s “totalitarian” emphasis on norms). See also 
Lessig, 27 J Legal Stud at 667–70 (cited in note 8) (discussing some ways in which the 
modalities of regulation could be used to regulate various behaviors but not addressing 
the individual’s ability to negotiate). 
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achieve the surveillance conditions that many apparently desire.10 
It selects as a departure point not the New Chicago School, with 
its emphasis on the capacities of institutions, but the work of 
psychologist Professor James Gibson, with its emphasis on the 
capacities of individual organisms to understand and act on the 
world. 
Famous everywhere but law,11 Gibson introduced the con-
cept of affordances in an effort to structure the study of percep-
tion.12 A key insight of affordance theory is that the same envi-
ronment or artifact holds different possibilities and dangers for 
different organisms.13 A hiding place that affords concealment 
and secrecy to a child may not afford the same to an adult. The 
theory of affordances is objective in the sense that features of 
the environment either do or do not exist, but it is subjective in 
the sense that the utility or danger to organisms is necessarily 
relational. 
The theory of affordances has influenced disciplines far afield 
from perceptual psychology.14 The approach could also be useful to 
legal scholars interested in what citizens can actually do within a 
legal system and why. First, as I explore below, affordance theory 
has evolved into a general method of inquiry with its own useful 
vocabulary and commitments. This Essay leverages these con-
cepts to lend structure to an otherwise-haphazard inquiry into 
the capabilities of citizens to perceive and affect surveillance. This 
Essay meanwhile contributes to affordance theory by insisting 
that law itself represents an affordance. 
Second, the prevalence of everyday affordances can be used 
as a benchmark by which to test the adequacy of reforms. There 
is no magical, objectively legitimate amount or degree of surveil-
lance. Nevertheless, we might expect an environment that is 
rich in affordances to tend toward equilibrium. That is, it seems 
more plausible to assert that citizens are comfortable with the 
 
 10 I have selected only a sample of the ways that Americans might resist and re-
form surveillance, and I then tackle these samples in only limited ways. The scope and 
purpose of this Essay are modest: the Essay showcases affordance theory as a potentially 
fruitful means by which to approach complex problems. 
 11 See text accompanying notes 26–30, 50. 
 12 James J. Gibson, The Theory of Affordances, in Robert Shaw and John Bransford, 
eds, Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing: Toward an Ecological Psychology 67, 67–69 (Lawrence 
Erlbaum 1977). 
 13 See id at 79 (“[A]n affordance . . . is a combination of physical properties of the 
environment that is uniquely suited to a given animal.”). 
 14 Affordance theory has influenced, for example, design, philosophy, web activism, 
robotics, ecology, and now law. See notes 12, 26–30, 50–51, and accompanying text. 
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existing balance between privacy and security if they under-
stand and can change that balance but do not do so.15 As Con-
gress passes new laws and courts revisit old doctrines, af-
fordance theory can help us understand whether these reforms 
provide real levers of power for citizens. 
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I in-
troduces the concept of affordances in further detail, including 
its reception and development within the technological and oth-
er literature. It also briefly introduces the novel concept of a le-
gal affordance. Part II applies affordance theory to the titular 
question whether Americans can resist surveillance. The picture 
that emerges is complex and warrants further exploration. But 
we begin to see through affordance theory a sense of why sur-
veillance can persist despite popular distaste and despite the 
many apparent avenues of resistance. Part III concludes with a 
discussion of why affordances are perhaps the best benchmark 
for reform. 
I.  LAW AND OTHER AFFORDANCES 
Professor Gibson, a psychologist, coined the term “af-
fordance” in the 1970s in a bid to integrate and structure the 
study of perception.16 Gibson noted that people and other organ-
isms interact with the same environment17—but they perceive 
that environment differently, in part due to each organism’s re-
spective abilities and limitations.18 Thus, a dog and a bird per-
ceive the edge of the same cliff as dangerous and irrelevant, re-
spectively. Gibson urged the theory of affordances as an 
alternative to the cognitive model in which all experiences are 
subjective and representation takes place entirely “in the head.”19 
For Gibson, the world has physical properties (stairs, air currents) 
as well as relational properties that they afford to the observer 
 
 15 Professor David Pozen helped me see this implication. 
 16 See note 12 and accompanying text. 
 17 Gibson, The Theory of Affordances at 70–71 (cited in note 12) (discussing “man’s 
alteration of the natural environment” and proclaiming that “[t]here is only one world 
. . . and all animals live in it”). 
 18 Id at 79 (“A man . . . measures [ ] features of the environment by the standard of 
his body.”). 
 19 William W. Gaver, Technology Affordances, in Scott P. Robertson, Gary M. Olson, 
and Judith S. Olson, eds, Proceedings of the ACM CHI 91 Human Factors in Computing 
Systems Conference 79, 79 (ACM 1991). 
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(climbing, flight). Thus, “an affordance is neither an objective 
property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like.”20 
Gibson and others who work within this framework identify 
a number of important properties of affordances that lend the 
concept additional structure. Affordances can be negative or pos-
itive, affording either danger or benefit depending on the organ-
ism21—as with my example of the dog and the bird. Affordances 
are usually contingent, at least to organisms that are capable of 
altering their environments. For example, a rock face may not 
afford climbing in the absence of steps or a climbing tool.22 
Importantly, affordances can be perceptible or hidden, 
meaning that there are aspects of the environment that would 
be perceived as useful or harmful were they observable to the 
organism.23 Even if an affordance is perceptible, it can be doubt-
ed—Gibson offers the example of a study involving infants who 
crawl up to a glass surface over a ledge and pat it with their 
hands but then refuse to believe that the surface affords sup-
port.24 Further, not all perceptible affordances are what they 
seem: affordances can be true or false.25 A false affordance can 
lead an organism to encounter or fail to avoid harm, as when an 
organism mistakenly believes that it has an escape route. 
Different disciplines have found affordance theory useful for 
different reasons.26 Insofar as the theory manages to bridge the ob-
jective and the subjective, philosophers invoke the approach in in-
terrogating the relationship between materiality and meaning.27 
 
 20 James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception 129 (Houghton 
Mifflin 1979). 
 21 See id at 137–38. 
 22 See id at 133–34 (“[W]hat the object affords us is what we normally pay atten-
tion to.”). 
 23 See Gibson, The Theory of Affordances at 80–82 (cited in note 12) (discussing the 
“misperceiving” of affordances). Professor William Gaver has noted that organisms can 
learn to perceive new affordances over time, and he has shown how affordances are often 
sequential (that is, acting on one affordance reveals the presence of another) or nested 
(that is, the affordances work together as a group). Gaver, Technology Affordances at 81–
82 (cited in note 19). 
 24 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception at 142 (cited in note 20).  
 25 See Gaver, Technology Affordances at 80 (cited in note 19) (“If information sug-
gests a nonexistent affordance, a false affordance exists upon which people may mistak-
enly try to act.”). 
 26 See, for example, Thomas E. Horton, Arpan Chakraborty, and Robert St. Amant, 
Affordances for Robots: A Brief Survey, 3 Avant 70, 73 (2012) (discussing the use of the 
theory of affordances in the field of artificial technology in order to “develop better 
agents”). 
 27 See, for example, John T. Sanders, Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, and the Materiality of 
Meaning, 26 Man & World 287, 295 (1993) (applying an affordance analysis to note that 
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But affordance theory is primarily useful because it suggests a 
structured means by which to examine the capabilities of a giv-
en organism as it interacts with an object or environment. Af-
fordance theory encourages us to ask what an organism situated 
in the world can really see and do, and what it is about the or-
ganism or the environment that makes this so. 
Largely for this latter reason, affordance theory has particu-
larly influenced the world of design. Leading design theorist 
Professor Donald Norman, for instance, discusses the utility of 
this concept in the design of everyday objects.28 Proper attention 
to affordances helps avoid false causality, as when a computer 
terminal happens to fail just when you touch it.29 And a well-
designed object such as a door should clearly signal its af-
fordances to the user—for example, that the door is to be pushed 
or pulled.30 
What of the design of law and legal institutions? As Gibson 
has recognized, “[t]he richest and most elaborate affordances of 
the environment are provided by other animals and, for us, other 
people.”31 We represent to one another innumerable opportuni-
ties and risks. Sex, conflict, cooperation, trade, and politics “all 
depend on the perceiving of what another person or other per-
sons afford, or sometimes on the misperceiving of it.”32 But de-
spite his recognition of its importance, Gibson left the issue 
there: his germinal work A Theory of Affordances does not elabo-
rate on what it means for people to be affordances to one another. 
It seems to me that law mediates interpersonal affordances 
in several ways. First, law helps set the conditions by which we 
afford. Two or more people engaged in a trade do so against a 
backdrop of contract law, tort law, and other rules. Variations in 
the legal status of a person or his environment change his af-
fordances with respect to that environment. A person’s home does 
not afford shelter to others, because of property laws. An unwill-
ing person never affords nutrition to others, even in the most ex-
treme circumstances, in part due to long-standing prohibitions on 
 
significance is something “found in the world” rather than “attributed to otherwise ‘neu-
tral’ things”). 
 28 Donald A. Norman, The Design of Everyday Things 9–12 (Basic Books 2002). 
 29 Id at 11 (noting that coincidences like the computer-terminal failure lead the us-
er “to believe that [the touching] caused the failure”). 
 30 See id at 87–92. 
 31 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception at 135 (cited in note 20). 
 32 Id. 
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cannibalism.33 The law also permits or denies the prospect of 
group affordances by, for example, protecting unions or provid-
ing for incorporation. 
Second, and relatedly, the law itself represents a set of af-
fordances. Individuals or groups can turn to the law for recourse 
or find themselves at risk because others have done so. Legal af-
fordances have the same basic features that I have already de-
scribed. You can realize or fail to realize that you have recourse 
at law. You can think that you have recourse at law but be 
wrong. And, of particular interest to this Essay, not every person 
has the same legal affordances, even when a violation of law has 
clearly occurred. I realize, of course, that the law is famously 
subject to interpretation.34 Perhaps law does not exist in an ob-
jective state in the way that, for example, a stairway does. But 
statutes and cases declare law, and we treat certain rights as 
immutable and real. 
Though there is next to no mention of Gibson in the legal 
literature,35 we do see echoes of and sympathies to his work. For 
example, the area of Legal Culture is interested in how social re-
lations predict who will invoke the law and under what circum-
stances,36 as is New Legal Realism.37 Other legal scholarship has 
 
 33 See, for example, Regina v Dudley and Stephens, 14 QBD 273, 288 (1884) (hold-
ing starving sailors criminally liable for killing and eating a nonconsenting passenger). 
 34 See, for example, Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—a Reply to Pro-
fessor Hart, 71 Harv L Rev 630, 661–69 (1958) (arguing that judicial interpretation must 
account for complex and difficult factors and must go beyond a focus on only the fixed 
meanings of individual words). 
 35 The Dutch law-and-technology scholar Professor Mireille Hildebrandt invoked Gibson 
in her examination of profiling technologies, which for Hildebrandt “seem[ ] to ‘afford’ a crim-
inal justice system that holds citizens responsible for displaying characteristics that match 
criminal profiles.” Mireille Hildebrandt, Proactive Forensic Profiling: Proactive Criminaliza-
tion?, in R.A. Duff, et al, eds, The Boundaries of the Criminal Law 113, 121 (Oxford 2010). 
Her focus is on technological affordances, however, not legal ones, and she tends to share 
with the New Chicago School an emphasis on the normative and behavioral implications of 
technology. See id at 121–22 (discussing “the constitutive and regulative normativity of 
technologies” and arguing that technologies afford rather than cause new behaviors). Profes-
sor Julie E. Cohen has also briefly invoked the concept of affordances to describe how systems 
place artificial or arbitrary limits on users, which may explain why she cited to Norman in-
stead of Gibson. Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of 
Everyday Practice 195 & n 10, 217–18 (Yale 2012) (expressing concern over “[l]egal rules 
that prohibit and punish unauthorized access to networked resources” and “the innate ten-
dency . . . to take the configurations of spaces and the affordances of artifacts as givens”). 
 36 See generally S.S. Silbey, Legal Culture and Legal Consciousness, in Neil J. 
Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, eds, 13 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behav-
ioral Sciences 8623 (Elsevier 2001). 
 37 See, for example, Mark C. Suchman and Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal 
Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 
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looked to the capabilities approach, a concept from institutional 
economics that is associated with Professors Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum, which assesses political systems by refer-
ence to the freedoms or capacities of their denizens.38 Capabili-
ties are, in a sense, affordances writ large in that they measure 
the potential for human flourishing within a society by reference 
to the physical, emotional, and other goals that members are 
able to effectively pursue and accomplish. 
Even the set of affordances that I investigate below—legal, 
market, technological, and political—roughly maps onto the four 
modalities of the New Chicago School—law, markets, architec-
ture, and norms—by which powerful entities can be said to “reg-
ulate” individuals and groups. The key difference is that af-
fordance theory starts with the pragmatic conditions that people 
can perceive and influence rather than with the theoretical 
methods by which large institutions constrain behavior. In 
short, this approach is new but not terribly far afield of available 
methods. 
II.  SURVEILLANCE: AN AFFORDANCE-BASED APPROACH 
This Part analyzes the question in the title—whether 
Americans really can resist or reform government surveillance—
by examining the affordances of everyday citizens and groups. 
There is not space for a full examination, which would require 
greater depth and breadth than this Essay can accommodate. 
Rather, the aim of this Part is to apply the concepts and vocabu-
lary of affordance theory to show that affordances in the surveil-
lance context vary by organism and are not always what they 
first appear. 
I ultimately analyze only a sampling of the affordances of 
everyday Americans to resist and reform surveillance: voting, 
litigating, hiding, and buying. I have selected relatively com-
mon, paradigmatic examples of asserting influence through poli-
tics, law, technology, and markets. Obviously missing are many 
other means of action and expression, such as art, protest, civil 
 
555, 561 (2010) (noting New Legal Realism’s “ground-level up perspective that draws 
attention to the effect of law on the everyday lives of ordinary people”). 
 38 For more on the capabilities approach, see Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Ca-
pabilities, 6 J Hum Dev 151, 153 (2005) (defining a “capability” as “the opportunity to 
achieve valuable combinations of human functionings—what a person is able to do or be”). 
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disobedience, and education.39 Such activities, while abundant 
and disparate, operate through the same basic channels of influ-
ence. Civil disobedience works, when it does, because it forces 
courts or politicians to confront and remedy an injustice. I imag-
ine that an affordance approach, which I propose and briefly 
showcase here, would also yield insights if applied to art, educa-
tion, protest, and other examples. 
A. Political Affordances 
Democracy is set up, in theory, to make politicians af-
fordances for their constituents.40 Perhaps the most obvious way 
that citizens of a democracy could influence surveillance policy 
would be to elect reform-minded leaders. One might think that a 
concerted-enough effort here could substantially change the way 
that we balance national security against civil liberties in the 
United States. And indeed, Congress recently took the occasion 
of the sunset (by statute)41 and invalidation (by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit)42 of the bulk col-
lection of American phone data by the NSA as an occasion to re-
quire more process before the NSA can access these records. 
Many other collection activities continue apace, however, and 
few hold their breath for a political sea change. 
Will privacy-minded politicians act as citizens expect? One 
way to think about the disconnect between what many Ameri-
cans say about their surveillance preferences and their lack of 
political action is through the lens of public-choice theory.43 This 
 
 39 For an example of work blending these strategies, see Camouflage from Face De-
tection (CV Dazzle), archived at http://perma.cc/34EU-2ZX6. 
 40 See Federalist 57 (Madison), in The Federalist 384, 385 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob 
E. Cooke, ed) (“[Representatives] will enter into the public service under circumstances 
which cannot fail to produce a temporary affection at least to their constituents. There is 
. . . some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns.”). 
 41 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective 
Discipline over Monitoring Act of 2015 (“USA FREEDOM Act”), Pub L No 114-23, 129 
Stat 268. 
 42 The NSA claimed authority to engage in bulk data collection under § 215 of the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”), Pub L No 107-56, 115 
Stat 272, 287–88, codified as amended at 50 USC §§ 1861–62. Section 215 was invalidat-
ed in American Civil Liberties Union v Clapper, 785 F3d 787 (2d Cir 2015). See id at 
812–13 (holding that the bulk data were not relevant to counterterrorism investigations 
and therefore that collection was not authorized by statute). 
 43 For an early and influential discussion of preferences and public-choice theory, 
see generally James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Michigan 1962). 
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story says that American preferences are diffuse across the popu-
lation and that they are weakly held. In contrast, the interests of 
the intelligence community, public and private, are very intense; 
that community is highly motivated, more homogenous in its 
values and goals, and close to the levers of power.44 Under these 
circumstances, it should hardly surprise us that Americans can-
not achieve an ideal balance between security and liberty. In the 
language of affordances, which again are subjective to the extent 
that they are relational by organism, we might say that the po-
litical process is a perceived but false affordance for citizens 
while it is a very true affordance for special interests. 
Public choice has some explanatory power in privacy law. 
One of the most careful and extensive examinations of attempts 
to achieve privacy through the political process comes from Pro-
fessor Priscilla Regan.45 She looked at several case studies—
including wiretaps and computer databases—in an effort to un-
pack the various policy dynamics behind federal lawmaking.46 
Regan observed that, in each instance that she examined, vested 
interests won out over privacy advocacy.47 She concluded that for 
meaningful change to occur, we must elevate privacy as a sub-
stantive societal value as well as wait patiently for a “policy 
window” in which to act.48  
But even if there were broader support for privacy over sur-
veillance, another problem arises regarding the affordances of pol-
iticians themselves. As discussed above, design theorist Professor 
Gaver has introduced the concept of a nested affordance, by which 
he means an affordance that leads to others.49 Professors Jennifer 
Earl and Katrina Kimport, both sociologists, have offered the con-
cept of leveraged affordances to describe “digitally enabled social 
change.”50 Their context is technology, but the insight is just as 
 
 44 For a discussion of the strengths of focused privacy interests, see Priscilla M. 
Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy 174–211 
(North Carolina 1995). 
 45 See generally id.  
 46 For Regan’s discussion of wiretaps, see id at 109–43. For Regan’s discussion of 
computer databases, see id at 69–108. 
 47 Id at 174, 181–90 (noting that each privacy issue addressed was “on the congres-
sional agenda for years, if not decades, before Congress passed legislation” and weighing 
the role of interest groups in this delay). 
 48 Regan, Legislating Privacy at 199 (cited in note 44), citing generally John W. 
Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Little, Brown 1984). 
 49 See notes 19, 23. 
 50 Jennifer Earl and Katrina Kimport, Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism 
in the Internet Age 33 (MIT 2011) (“That a technology such as a computer or the Web can 
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applicable to people. Politicians can be seen as the affordances of 
the citizenry because they are, in theory, responsive to their 
constituents. But if they lack affordances of their own in a par-
ticular domain, then no degree of responsiveness will create an 
affordance for the citizenry. 
Put another way, politicians are true affordances for citizens 
to the extent that they have affordances themselves—in other 
words, to the extent that they are actually in a position to con-
duct meaningful oversight of the intelligence community. Work 
in law and political science (and to some extent, common sense) 
suggests that politicians are not so positioned. With respect to 
national intelligence, specifically, political scientist Professor 
Amy Zegart has discussed why congressional oversight of the 
executive branch remains elusive even in the face of statutory 
schemes that provide for it.51 She has pointed in particular to 
politicians’ lack of information about surveillance programs and, 
more importantly, their lack of expertise to assess the infor-
mation that they have. As Zegart has put it, “expertise is critical 
and always in short supply.”52 
B. Legal Affordances 
Elected officials are not citizens’ only recourse. The United 
States is a constitutional democracy, founded in a context of skep-
ticism about governmental power and the tyranny of the many. 
An important purpose of our third branch of government is to 
render meaningful the guarantees of the Constitution, including 
those provisions—such as the First Amendment’s dictates around 
speech and assembly or the Fourth Amendment’s warrant re-
quirement—that implicate surveillance. The states also have con-
stitutions, some of which directly mention privacy.53 
 
offer an affordance doesn’t really matter unless people leverage that affordance. We call 
this the leveraged affordances approach.”). 
 51 See generally Amy B. Zegart, The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence 
Oversight, 126 Polit Sci Q 1 (2011). 
 52 Id at 9. This claim is in line with what other scholars have observed, including 
within this Symposium. Additional issues include the lack of visibility (and hence, credit) 
of good stewardship and extreme risk aversion should terrorist activity actually occur. 
See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Cheneyism and Snowdenism, 83 U Chi L Rev 
271, 285 (2016) (discussing the “epistemic difficulty” of quantifying the costs and benefits 
of national-security safeguards). 
 53 See, for example, Cal Const Art I, § 1 (listing the pursuit of privacy as among cit-
izens’ “inalienable rights”); Hawaii Const Art I, § 6 (“The right of the people to privacy is 
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state inter-
est.”); Ill Const Art I, § 6 (“The people shall have the right to be secure . . . against . . . 
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In theory, then, courts afford individuals and groups a num-
ber of ways to challenge surveillance. But while the law sets a 
baseline for what is permissible and checks the worst abuses, 
the courts have not historically afforded a meaningful avenue of 
reform.54 It is not that surveillance proceeds entirely in the ab-
sence of legal limits but rather that the citizen does not possess 
a significant legal lever to limit surveillance beyond today’s 
baseline levels. Thus, constitutional law can also be a false or 
misleading affordance in practice. 
This is true for a few reasons. One involves issues of harm 
and standing. Generally speaking, it is not as though any citizen 
concerned about surveillance can challenge it under the First or 
Fourth Amendment. Rather, the citizen must have a specific in-
terest in a particular intrusion. In the First Amendment con-
text—that is, when the monitoring of a person or group by the 
government is extensive enough to implicate free speech—the 
citizen generally must show that he is in fact being watched and 
that this monitoring chills his ability to assemble or to express 
himself. 
This turns out to be difficult. Much surveillance occurs in 
secret, such that litigants cannot show that they are in fact be-
ing watched. Courts have even implied that the very act of suing 
can be evidence that a litigant has not been cowed. Thus, in 
Laird v Tatum,55 the Supreme Court acknowledged that “consti-
tutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ ef-
fect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohi-
bition against the exercise of First Amendment rights,”56 but the 
Court ultimately did not find that the respondents before it were 
chilled.57 Indeed, the respondents “cast considerable doubt on 
whether they themselves [were] in fact suffering from any such 
chill,” in part because the petitioners had the temerity to talk 
about the government’s surveillance in public and challenge it in 
court.58 
In the Fourth Amendment context, the citizen must show 
that his own reasonable privacy interest has been unreasonably 
 
invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or oth-
er means.”). 
 54 See text accompanying notes 55–65. 
 55 408 US 1 (1972). 
 56 Id at 11. 
 57 Id at 13–14. 
 58 Id at 13 n 7 (discussing how counsel for the litigants at bar admitted that they 
were “not people, obviously, who [were] cowed and chilled”). 
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invaded.59 Until very recently, “claims for facial relief under the 
Fourth Amendment [were] unlikely to succeed” unless they 
sought to cure a defect in a warrant clause.60 A citizen still can-
not sue over the invasion of another’s interest, even when the 
unlawfully obtained evidence is introduced against him in 
court.61 The recourse of the third party whose interest was in-
vaded (such as the mother of the defendants in United States v 
Salvucci62) is limited to tort, which “[t]he Court has failed to 
nurture and at times has affirmatively undermined.”63 A court 
will not exclude evidence obtained in clear contravention of the 
Fourth Amendment unless it was the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment right that was violated. 
This issue is compounded by the contemporary reality that 
corporations act as custodians of our digital lives. It is often eas-
ier for law enforcement to request your web history from Google 
or AT&T rather than from you. And, generally speaking, the law 
treats many categories of information transferred from you to a 
third party like a corporation as less private and hence less well 
protected by constitutional criminal procedure.64 This tendency 
in the law is known, and sometimes lamented, as the third-party 
doctrine.65 
A simpler reason for why courts afford less recourse is that 
unsympathetic and underresourced defendants make unfortu-
nate champions for the rest of society. The point is controverted, 
but it seems clear at one level that many of the legal affordances 
against surveillance are set and tested by a deeply unrepre-
sentative sample of society—people that do not necessarily have 
the same capabilities or motivations as everyone else. We all 
 
 59 See Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan concurring). 
 60 City of Los Angeles, California v Patel, 135 S Ct 2443, 2449–50 (2015) (clarifying 
that facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not disfavored). 
 61 See, for example, United States v Salvucci, 448 US 83, 85 (1980) (holding that 
the defendants lacked standing unless “their own Fourth Amendment rights ha[d] in fact 
been violated”). 
 62 488 US 83 (1980). 
 63 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 757, 
785 (1994). 
 64 See, for example, United States v Miller, 425 US 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
conveyed by him to Government authorities.”). 
 65 For a discussion of the third-party doctrine, see Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of 
Privacy, 154 U Pa L Rev 477, 528–29 (2006). 
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wind up with the affordances of the accused criminal, who is in 
certain respects our lowest common denominator.66 
The people who are in court litigating against the govern-
ment over the fruits of police surveillance have a significant, 
sometimes life-or-death interest in narrowing the capabilities of 
law enforcement. So you might think that criminal defendants 
are particularly well suited to push back against surveillance—
but not according to Professor Akhil Amar, who has offered a va-
riety of reasons why the accused criminal is a bad proxy for soci-
ety as whole and, indeed, “an awkward champion of the Fourth 
Amendment.”67 The criminal is unsympathetic, for instance, and 
often litigates bad facts, heedless of what this will do to Fourth 
Amendment precedent in general.68 The accused criminal rarely 
has access to a good lawyer.69 And so on. 
Also skeptical is Professor Shima Baradaran, who points out 
that courts side with the state over defendants in the overwhelm-
ing majority (specifically, four out of five) of Fourth Amendment 
cases.70 The problem, according to Baradaran, is that individual 
defendants do not present courts with relevant statistics or other 
information to help them balance law enforcement’s conduct 
against societal interests in privacy.71 Thus, courts engage in 
“blind balancing” that almost invariably inures against the crimi-
nal defendant and, by extension, to the innocent citizens whom 
the Fourth Amendment also avowedly protects.72 
There are many more ways in which citizens hoping to 
achieve reform through the courts are stymied, and there are al-
so notable exceptions. My point is that the many citizens who 
complain of excessive government surveillance cannot always 
look to the courts to strike a different balance, despite a long 
constitutional tradition of limited government. They have legal 
 
 66 See Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 796 (cited in note 63) (“The criminal defendant is a 
kind of private attorney general. But the worst kind.”). Of course, in the words of Fyodor 
Dostoyevski, “[t]he degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its pris-
ons.” Fred R. Shapiro, ed, The Yale Book of Quotations 210 (Yale 2006). 
 67 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 796 (cited in note 63). 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. 
 70 Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 Georgetown L J 1, 
43 (2013). 
 71 Of course, litigants have been introducing broader sociological data since at least 
the 1900s. See, for example, Muller v Oregon, 208 US 412, 419 (1908) (citing the now-
famous “Brandeis Brief ”). And some judges may feel free to seek out their own sources, 
including the Internet. See, for example, Rowe v Gibson, 798 F3d 622, 628–30 (7th Cir 
2015) (relying on Judge Richard Posner’s investigation into the efficacy of Zantac). 
 72 Baradaran, 102 Georgetown L J at 3 (cited in note 70). 
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rights on paper, including some very old and important paper 
like the Constitution. But, as with political affordances, the legal 
affordances of citizens are somewhat limited by judicial prece-
dent and other forces. 
C. Technological Affordances 
The previous two sections focus, respectively, on the capaci-
ty of individuals to restrain government through legislatures 
and courts. As Professor Lawrence Lessig’s interlocutors remind 
us, individuals and firms have technological means for re-
sistance as well.73 For the purposes of this Section, I will use the 
example of encryption to highlight a promising but ultimately 
limited means by which people can hide from their government. 
Encryption, of course, refers to the process of rendering 
communications unreadable to anyone but the recipient, thereby 
interfering with surveillance rather directly. Encryption is a 
straightforward technological affordance in that it affords hid-
ing. And it affords very good hiding: over-the-counter encryption, 
so to speak, apparently can thwart sophisticated attempts to ac-
cess protected content.74 Encryption is very promising. It is a 
technological affordance that is available to most and does not 
necessarily rely on the goodwill of third parties. Encryption is no 
panacea, however, and it also runs the risk of being a false af-
fordance without proper attention. 
There are a number of challenges. For encryption to help 
most citizens, it has to be usable. It often is not. A few years ago, 
computer scientist Alma Whitten and electrical engineer Profes-
sor Doug Tygar conducted a usability assessment of version five 
of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), a leading security program with a 
“good user interface by general standards.”75 They found, fa-
mously in computer-security circles, that what makes for usable 
software in general does not suffice when it comes to security.76 
 
 73 See, for example, Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 Va L Rev 679, 707–09 (2003) 
(describing how people use software to avoid law); James Grimmelmann, Note, Regula-
tion by Software, 114 Yale L J 1719, 1742–43 (2005) (discussing how savvy users can 
evade software restrictions). 
 74  See Adrian Covert, iOS Encryption Is So Good, Not Even the NSA Can Hack It 
(Gizmodo, Aug 13, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/E4SW-CVZ8 (noting that the new-
est version of the popular iPhone has very good encryption). 
 75 Alma Whitten and J.D. Tygar, Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt: A Usability Evalua-
tion of PGP 5.0, in Lorrie Faith Cranor and Simson Garfinkel, eds, Security and Usabil-
ity: Designing Secure Systems That People Can Use 669, 669 (O’Reilly 2005). 
 76 See id at 689–90. 
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Their test subjects made errors and, as a consequence, did not 
actually hide what they were saying.77 
A much more recent paper looks at the technological af-
fordances of a particular population for whom secrecy and discre-
tion are of great importance. A journalism professor at Columbia 
University partnered with computer scientists at the University 
of Washington to undertake an examination of whether availa-
ble tools of anonymization and encryption work for investigative 
journalists.78 Like Whitten and Tygar, this team found that ex-
isting technology was still not usable.79 Further, available tech-
nology tended to “actively interfere with other aspects of the 
journalistic process” such as the verifiability of sources and 
source information.80 This was despite the fact that journalists 
are commonly identified as the very people who need heightened 
computer security to accomplish their important work.81 
If encryption is not usable, or, at any rate, if it is not widely 
used, then those who do use encryption can wind up as targets; a 
positive affordance becomes a negative one. There are several 
reasons why the subjects of government surveillance must still 
worry even if traffic is encrypted. There is always the possibility 
that, with enough resources thrown at the problem, some en-
cryption will be broken. There is also the ability to compromise 
the user’s computer to access communications before they are 
encrypted in the first place. And even assuming that the gov-
ernment can see only the direction and frequency of traffic—that 
is, so-called metadata—the computer science literature is in-
creasingly clear that the government may still make guesses as 
to the content.82 
Among the most promising developments for privacy enthusi-
asts following the revelations of CIA contractor Edward Snowden 
have been the decisions of Apple, Google, and other companies to 
 
 77 See id at 689. 
 78 See Susan E. McGregor, et al, Investigating the Computer Security Practices and 
Needs of Journalists *399 (USENIX, Aug 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/W555 
-QML3. USENIX is the premiere academic symposium on computer security. 
 79 See id at *410. 
 80 Id at *399. 
 81 See id at *412. 
 82 Consider Shahram Mohrehkesh, et al, Demographic Prediction of Mobile User 
from Phone Usage (Mobile Data Challenge), archived at http://perma.cc/Q3ZB-APUC 
(describing the results of a study that attempted to predict a user’s demographic attrib-
utes using metadata). 
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encrypt communications by default.83 Defaulting to encryption 
obviates the above problems—something that is already turned 
on need not be usable, and most people stick with defaults, mak-
ing encryption widespread.84 The prospect that citizens can pool 
affordances as consumers is the subject of the next Section. 
D. Group or Market Affordances 
Even if citizens struggle to invoke their rights individually, 
perhaps they can use the market to pressure powerful firms to 
vindicate those rights in their stead. Contemporary companies 
hold centrally and in bulk most of the personal details that law 
enforcement is usually after, and firms have the resources to 
fight government surveillance of their customers.85 Indeed, the 
Snowden revelations and subsequent global reaction to the 
NSA’s spying capabilities have invigorated privacy as a competi-
tive differentiator.86 Firms are making technological changes 
(some of which are discussed above) and pushing back against 
subpoenas with greater force. 
Just as governments can leverage the market as a modality 
of regulation—for example, by increasing taxes on undesirable 
behavior—so too can citizens pool their affordances through the 
market to pressure larger, organized firms to press their inter-
ests. This could be thought of as an instance of nested or sequen-
tial affordances, group affordances, or something similar. By any 
label, we cannot answer the question whether Americans can re-
sist surveillance without thinking through the affordances and 
incentives of the large corporations that hold their data. 
History is not so promising here. As Professor Jack Balkin, 
Professor Jon Michaels, and others argue, the best way to charac-
terize the past relationship between governments and corporations 
 
 83 Joe Miller, Google and Apple to Introduce Default Encryption (BBC, Sept 19, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9XG4-DVZT.  
 84 Of course, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. Today, law enforcement is ac-
tively reigniting the battle over back doors by arguing that the FBI and others should 
have access to keys that unlock all encryption when necessary. See Dan Kedmey, Apple 
and Google Want Obama to Let Them Encrypt Your Phone (Time, May 19, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/M2ZN-K7RY. 
 85 See, for example, Covert, iOS Encryption Is So Good (cited in note 74). 
 86 See Solange Deschatres, Android vs. iOS: Which Is More Secure? (Forbes, July 
24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6FRD-SHDS (“Some might say there are fewer dif-
ferentiators now between iOS and Android. But here’s a breakdown of the host of securi-
ty threats they face, and the varying ways in which Apple and Google attempt to miti-
gate them.”). 
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around surveillance is synergistic.87 Firms use government-
mandated data and governments leverage private databases and 
tools. Both firm and government activities erode societal expec-
tations of privacy. 
There is also evidence that corporate resistance is relatively 
rare in practice. Recent work by Professor Avidan Cover exam-
ines whether, as some argue, companies can nevertheless stand 
in the shoes of individuals and assert privacy claims on individ-
uals’ behalf.88 Cover concludes that corporations seldom push 
back against the government in practice and that when they do, 
they are hamstrung by a variety of forces.89 The company, like 
the criminal defendant, tends to put its own interest before that 
of the consumer. The government can make life more or less 
pleasant for a company, including by conferring immunity from 
suit should consumers get upset.90 Cover also takes issue, nor-
matively, with the idea that citizens should have to rely on com-
panies to press their freedoms—especially in light of the role 
that British companies played in the perceived abuses of colonial 
America.91 
To these arguments we might add another: promises in this 
context are especially cheap. A pledge not to cooperate with the 
government, made for reasons of consumer trust and competi-
tion, is not going to be easy to enforce. The market affords great-
er privacy only if consumers can select privacy as a preference 
and believe that the preference will be respected. There is rea-
son to think that this preference will not be respected, given 
that the same government that is asking for the data will also be 
enforcing the failure to resist. 
 
 87 See, for example, Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance 
State, 93 Minn L Rev 1, 7–8 (2008) (“Public and private enterprises are thoroughly inter-
twined.”); Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partner-
ships in the War on Terror, 96 Cal L Rev 901, 904 (2008) (discussing the executive 
branch’s informal agreements with corporations). 
 88 Avidan Y. Cover, Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist Fourth 
Amendment, 100 Iowa L Rev 1441, 1456 (2015), citing Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich L Rev 561, 595–600 (2009). 
 89 Cover, 100 Iowa L Rev at 1463–73 (cited in note 88). 
 90 This occurred when Congress conferred retroactive immunity on Internet service 
providers (ISPs) that cooperated with the NSA through passage of the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008 § 201, Pub L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2436, 2467, codified at 50 USC §§ 1885 to 
1885c (“[A] civil action may not lie or be maintained in a Federal or State court against any 
person for providing assistance to an element of the intelligence community.”). 
 91 Cover, 100 Iowa L Rev at 1487–88 (cited in note 88) (describing the role that the 
East India Company played in starting the American Revolution, as well as the Framers’ 
views on corporations and monopolies). 
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Take the respective privacy policies of two companies that 
store and analyze consumers’ genetic information. The company 
23andMe, which sells saliva-based genome tests to individual 
consumers, says in its privacy policy that if it receives a lawful 
request for genetic information, it will turn that information 
over to the government: “Under certain circumstances Personal 
Information may be subject to disclosure pursuant to judicial or 
other government subpoenas, warrants, or orders, or in coordi-
nation with regulatory authorities.”92 A competitor of 23andMe, 
Navigenics, also acknowledges the prospect that the government 
may seek to compel disclosure, but unlike 23andMe, it commits 
to “use reasonable and lawful efforts to limit the scope of any 
such legally required disclosure.”93 
For the many civilian-consumers who worry about privacy, 
this would seem to suggest that Navigenics is the better choice 
for personalized genetics. But what happens if Navigenics de-
cides not to push back as advertised? Generally speaking, if a 
firm makes a promise to its consumers and violates it, those con-
sumers have recourse—a legal affordance—in the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) or state equivalents.94 The FTC can bring an 
enforcement proceeding under its authority to police against de-
ceptive statements.95 Here, however, the FTC—itself a govern-
ment enforcement agency—would have to penalize Navigenics 
for cooperating with another government enforcement agency. 
That even an independent agency like the FTC would do this 
strikes me as very unlikely, and it therefore tends to hollow out 
this particular kind of market promise. 
Nevertheless, it is hard not to see the potential here. 
Against a background of corporate and other law, and given ac-
cess to enormous resources, large firms are well positioned to 
push back against government surveillance if they are properly 
motivated. That motivation appears to be mounting in the form 
of domestic and, to a large degree, international pressures on 
American firms to put citizen-consumer privacy first. 
 
 92 Privacy Highlights (23andMe), archived at http://perma.cc/K9EQ-FZ3R. 
 93 Privacy Policy (Navigenics), archived at http://perma.cc/8AJT-X6C6. 
 94 See 15 USC §§ 52–54 (authorizing the FTC to pursue penalties or injunctive re-
lief for false advertising, or “unfair or deceptive act[s] or practice[s]”). 
 95 15 USC §§ 41–58. 
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III.  AFFORDANCES AS A BENCHMARK 
To summarize the argument so far: An affordance refers to 
an aspect of the environment that holds promise or danger de-
pending on an organism’s capacities. Citizens have a number of 
perceived affordances when it comes to surveillance—political, 
legal, technological, and other avenues to resist or effectuate 
change. But upon inspection, many of these affordances turn out 
to be false or compromised. Citizens can vote officials who care 
about privacy into office, but those officials lack the capacity for 
real oversight. Citizens have technological means by which to 
resist surveillance, but the technologies lack usability and can 
turn citizens into targets. Citizens can extract promises from 
firms to push back against surveillance on their behalf, but they 
have no recourse if these promises are not enforced. 
This is a bleak picture, but there are bright spots as well. 
Congress enacted modest reforms to NSA surveillance in 2015, 
and companies have shown an interest in pushing back against 
demands for consumer data.96 Recent case law is particularly 
promising. In a series of Fourth Amendment decisions, the Su-
preme Court has shown a willingness to interpret the Constitu-
tion more favorably, if not more broadly.97 In the 2015 term, the 
Court repudiated its prior holding that Fourth Amendment cas-
es were too fact bound to accommodate facial challenges, allow-
ing a hotel owner to challenge a statute that gave the police ac-
cess to his visitor logs.98 Another recent decision recognized the 
intimacy and extent of the data that we keep on our personal 
devices and clarified that officers cannot search a smartphone 
merely incident to arrest and without a warrant,99 which some 
commentators believe paves the way toward a reexamination of 
the third-party doctrine.100 
 
 96 Among other things, the USA FREEDOM Act requires ISPs instead of the NSA 
to store telephone records and makes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the 
court that grants the NSA approval for its activities, more adversarial. See USA 
FREEDOM Act § 501, 129 Stat at 282–83, codified in various sections of Titles 12, 15, 
and 18; USA FREEDOM Act § 402, 129 Stat at 281–82, codified at 50 USC §§ 1871–74. 
 97 Various majority opinions have, in a sense, narrowed the case law in places by 
tying it closely to the common-law tort of trespass. See, for example, Florida v Jardines, 
133 S Ct 1409, 1415–17 (2013) (holding that bringing a drug-sniffing dog onto private 
property requires probable cause); United States v Jones, 132 S Ct 945, 949 (2012) (hold-
ing that affixing a GPS to a car requires probable cause). 
 98 See City of Los Angeles, California v Patel, 135 S Ct 2443, 2449–51 (2015). 
 99 See Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473, 2484–88 (2014). 
 100 See, for example, Ryan Watzel, Riley’s Implications for Fourth Amendment Pro-
tection in the Cloud, 124 Yale L J F 73, 73–74 (2014) (“[W]hile failing to explicitly afford 
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We can say, perhaps, that the picture is improving. But we 
have no real means of describing when the picture has improved 
enough. We lack a benchmark for surveillance reform. Presuma-
bly the tolerable—let alone optimal—degree of government sur-
veillance of citizens is not zero, or any specific number. We can-
not refer to an ideal amount of money spent on surveillance or 
point to a particular year that was just fine for privacy. Ask citi-
zens what the right balance is between privacy and security and 
you are likely to get different answers. 
In other words, we cannot say what equilibrium looks like 
by describing surveillance activity or policy. But we may be able 
to say more about what equilibrium looks like as a condition. It 
is here that I see additional utility in the concept of affordances. 
We can and should evaluate reforms to political institutions, 
laws, technology, and markets by reference to the effects on the 
affordances of everyday citizens. If we are ever able to document 
that people have legitimate and practical means to resist and re-
form government surveillance, but that they still choose not to 
do so, then a much stronger case can be made that our society 
has struck an appropriate balance. As this analysis has shown, 
we are very far from this utopian place. But perhaps we are a 
little closer to seeing what it might look like. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay poses the important but underexamined question 
whether Americans have the means by which to resist and reform 
surveillance. It then introduces the concept of affordances to help 
structure an answer to that question. In so doing, this Essay 
makes three contributions. First, it suggests that affordance theo-
ry has both something to teach and something to learn from legal 
theory. Law dictates how people can be affordances to one anoth-
er, and it is itself a kind of affordance. Second, this Essay exam-
ines surveillance affordances of various kinds—political, legal, 
technological, and market—and in each instance finds limits to 
otherwise-viable avenues of resistance and reform. Finally, this 
Essay proposes the proliferation of positive citizen affordances as 
a benchmark for reform. If Americans can resist surveillance in 
theory and in practice, then, and only then, their failure to do so 
gestures toward equilibrium and legitimacy. 
 
Fourth Amendment protection to cloud-based data, Riley still provides the best evidence 
yet that the Court may be ready to reconsider the third-party doctrine.”). 
